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Presumably, the exponent of logical normativity believes it to be the case 
that rational agents ought to reason logically. If the converse holds, and the 
exponent of logical normativity believes either (a) that it is false that rational 
agents ought to reason logically or (b) that the claim that rational agents ought 
to reason logically is not truth–functional, then any attempt to formulate 
sound arguments in support of their position will be either question–beg-
ging or self–contradictory. To argue in favour of the normative status of logic 
involves the assumption that the issue is substantive. I draw a distinction 
between deontic and axiological normativity as applied to logical theory and 
demonstrate that because deontic sentences are not truth–functional, logic 
cannot be normative in the deontic sense. I conclude that the only sense in 
which logical theory may be thought of as normative is axiologically.
Presumably, the exponent of logical normativity believes it to be the case 
that rational agents ought to reason logically.
The claim that logic is normative is itself declarative — it is either true, or 
it is false. However, the corollary of this claim is that rational agents ought to 
reason logically, which is an injunction in the imperative mood — it is non–
extensional. Putting aside the question of whether such a move can legiti-
mately escape Hume’s Guillotine, the proponent of logical normativity surely 
believes it to be true that rational agents ought to reason logically. If the con-
verse holds, and the exponent of logical normativity believes either (a) that 
it is false that rational agents ought to reason logically or (b) that the claim 
that rational agents ought to reason logically is not truth–functional, then any 
attempt to formulate sound arguments in support of their position will be 
either question–begging or self–contradictory. To argue in favour of the nor-
mative status of logic involves the assumption that the issue is substantive.1
* Christopher J. Searle, University of Oxford, E–mail: christopher.searle@conted.ox.ac.uk
1 It assumed from the outset that the only reasonable sense in which logic can be held to 
be normative is categorically, as opposed to hypothetically. The hypothetical imperative: 
‘if we want to reason well, then we ought to reason within the bounds of logic’ is unin-
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In dealing with the question of the normative status of logical theory, 
much emphasis has been given over to the explication of logic, validity, and 
of inference, but very little to precisely what might be meant by normativity 
(Tappolet 2014, 39–54). It is within this gap in the literature that this paper 
hopefully finds a place.
The arguments presented here aim to demonstrate how the general 
claim that logical theory is normative arises from a failure to recognise two 
distinct notions relating to Jörgensen’s Dilemma. The first is that sentences 
in the imperative mood are not truth–functional, and so it cannot be true 
that successful reasoners ought to follow the rules of logic; the second, fol-
lowing Tappolet, is that a distinction can be drawn between deontic and axi-
ological normativity as applied to logical theory (Tappolet 2013). The bulk 
of the paper is devoted to demonstrating that because deontic sentences are 
not truth–functional, logic cannot be normative in the deontic sense; and it 
concludes that the only sense in which logical theory may be thought of as 
normative is axiologically.
Jörgensen’s Dilemma can be summarised as follows:
1.  Arguments containing imperatives are either valid or invalid. 
2.  If such arguments are valid, then either: 
 a. An account of validity is required that is not reliant on truth
     functionality, or
 b. An account of the truth functionality of imperatives is required.
3.  If such arguments are invalid, then ethical reasoning involving im-
peratives is mistaken.
(Jörgensen 1937, 288–296)
The standard definition of validity assumed throughout, is that a valid 
argument is one such that there is no possible world where the premises are 
true and the conclusion false (Talbot 2017). In this paper I attempt to grasp 
the second horn of the dilemma (3) and defend the notion that since deontic 
sentences are not truth functional, arguments with deontic premises are in-
valid in this sense of the term.2
formative. Reasoning well means something like reasoning within the bounds of logic. 
So, the material conditional: ‘If we want to reason well, then we ought to reason within 
the bounds of logic’ is translatable mutatis mutandis to: ‘If we want to reason within the 
bounds of logic, then we ought to reason within the bounds of logic’. The exponent of logi-
cal normativity presumably intends more by their claim than: if we want p, then we ought 
p, which may be better described by a theory of desire.
2 I propose an expressivist account of ethical inference in another paper (see (Searle 2019)), 
where I defend the notion that ethical statements are indexical non–propositional atti-
tudes, and this accounts for both embedded and unembedded conative content without 
equivocation, including in deontic modal sentences.
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The thesis I wish to defend concords loosely with Harman’s challenge, 
which suggests that a dichotomy pertains between theories of deductive 
logic and theories of reasoning, where the former are concerned with logi-
cal relations and the latter with rules of belief revision. The general claim 
that logic is normative results from a conflation of the two (Harman 2002, 
171–186). As appealing as this solution is, there are some compelling argu-
ments for rejecting it (John MacFarlane 2004). So, rather than focusing on 
the distinction between logic and reasoning, the distinction drawn here is 
between types of normativity.
What is not disputed is that logical theory sets standards for reason-
ing well, or that theory informs practice etc. Logic is clearly instrumentally 
valuable to the reasoner; if truth is the end of reasoning, logic is surely the 
means (Reinmuth and Siegwart 2016, 417–432).
The proponent of logical normativity might view the main argument as 
suggesting that since there are no normative facts, to claim it is a fact that 
logic is normative, is false. But this would be to set up a strawman. It is con-
ceded that logic could be normative, and if it is, then it need not necessarily 
be a normative fact that logic is normative. But if there are normative facts, 
then what sort of fact would fit the claim that logic is normative?
The question of the normative status of logic in not trivial, it has signifi-
cant ethical consequences. If logic is normative, and deontic sentences are 
taken to be truth–functional, that is to say, if there are normative facts, then 
ethical realism becomes a far more tenable position (Labukt 2019)
Perhaps the most quoted passage attesting to the normative status of 
logic is from Frege’s The Basic Laws of Arithmetic: 
‘Laws of logic … are the most general laws, which prescribe universally the way 
in which one ought to think if one is to think at all’ (Frege and Furth 1964).3
However, as Gillian Russell proposes, the claim that logic is normative is 
equivocal. She argues that there are three distinct reasons for supposing that 
logic is ‘normative’. The first is that the logic has normative consequences, 
3 This particular passage seems to inform the bulk of the literature. However, some confu-
sion may have arisen from a potential mistranslation. “…dass sie die allgemeinsten sind, 
die überall da vorschreiben, wie gedacht werden soll, wo überhaupt gedacht wird” (Frege 
1962). The German for ought, ‘sollen’, does not actually occur in the original. The verb 
that is used is ‘vorschreiben’ meaning to prescribe. I would therefore like to proffer the 
following less contentious translation: “The laws of thought…are the most general, which 
universally prescribe how to think, where there is thought at all.” The key thing to take 
away from Frege’s suggested showing, is just that this putative deontic sentence is actu-
ally an indicative conditional, not an injunction. The passage expresses the hypothetical 
imperative ‘If you think at all, then you will think by the laws of thought’ as opposed to 
the categorical deontic imperative ‘one ought to think by the laws of thought’, which may 
lend support to the notion that Frege would have thought of logic as being axiologically 
normative, but not deontically so. 
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the second is that logical laws are often violated whereas descriptive laws 
are not, the third is that if logic is normative it can be demarcated from other 
similar academic disciplines and saved from accusations of constructivism 
(Russell 2020, 371–388). 
The reason that logic is perceived as normative in contrast to its sister 
disciplines of mathematics and physics, is that the subject matter of the 
latter two determines the truth or falsity of their respective constituent 
propositions. Maths and physics are descriptive, not normative. The correct 
description of a physical phenomenon will give rise to a true theory of phys-
ics, whereas it is unclear what sort of phenomena, if any, logic attempts to 
describe. Logic seemingly has no subject matter; it is not about anything, as 
Wittgenstein prosaically put it: 
“The logic of the world is prior to all truth and falsehood” (Wittgenstein and 
others 1988).
If truth functionality is a necessary condition for a sentence to be in-
cluded within the scope of logic, then deontic sentences clearly fall outside 
of the scope of logic. However, as Vranas argues, there are good reasons for 
wanting to include deontic sentences within the scope of logic, namely that 
in normal discourse we do seem to reason with imperatives (Vranas 2008, 
529–572). It is for precisely this reason that many philosophers choose to 
grasp the first horn of Jörgensen’s dilemma and argue for an extended ac-
count of validity. Others, such as WoleĔski, have opted for the alternative 
of retaining a classical conception of validity but instead stressing that de-
ontic sentences are truth functional, but the burden of proof is significant 
(WoleĔski 2018).
It is assumed that logical theory sets norms of reasoning by which argu-
ments are judged to be good or bad, but that such norms are insufficient for 
deontic normativity (Talbot 2015, 4).
My master argument for the non–normativity of logic runs as follows:
1. If logic is deontically normative, then we ought to think logically. 
2. It is not the case that we ought to think logically.
3. Therefore, it is not the case that logic is deontically normative.
In support of (2), we can confidently assert that if deontic sentences are 
not truth bearing, then it is not literally true that we ought to think logically. 
This leads to the following expanded argument: 
1. If logic is deontically normative, then we ought to think logically. 
2. If deontic sentences are not truth bearing, then it is not the case that 
we ought to think logically.
3. Deontic sentences are not truth bearing.
4. It is not the case that we ought to think logically.
5. Therefore, it is not the case that logic is deontically normative.
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Assuming, ceteris paribus, that the sentential variable O is extensional, 
then the expanded argument is valid in the propositional calculus, as the 
following semi–formalisation demonstrates:
1. N ᄭ O
2. ~D ᄭ~O
3. ~D   Assumption.
4. ~O   2 & 3 Modus Ponens
5. / ᄱ~N   4 & 1 Modus Tollens 
Where:
N: Logic is deontically normative.
O: We ought to think logically.
D: Deontic sentences are not truth bearing
Unless there is good reason to believe that imperatives are truth func-
tional, and (3) is false, then O cannot be true, so the argument is sound, QED. 
The proponent of normativity may attempt to rebut this argument by 
claiming that it begs the question, or that it fails its own test. It might seem 
that if we accept premise (3) that deontic sentences are not truth bearing 
then, as per Jörgensen (Jörgensen 1937, 288–296), we cannot claim that O 
(the apodosis of the conditional statement (1)) is either true of false, and 
consequently we cannot determine if the argument is valid or invalid.
However, in negating the apodosis O of the conditional statement (1), 
we are not making a deontic claim. The deontic variable is bound by the 
negation. Following SDL (McNamara 2019), the statement ‘it is not the case 
that we ought to think logically’ is not logically equivalent to ‘we ought not 
to think logically’.
~(OBp) Ł OB~p
The statement ‘it is not the case that we ought to think logically’ is sim-
ply the negation of the claim that ‘we ought to think logically’. 
~(OBp) asserts that the term ‘OBp’ fails to signify. 
Thus, although both protasis and apodosis are false, the material condi-
tional premise (1) remains true in £1.
1. If logic is deontically normative, then we ought to think logically. 
It is not the case that logic is deontically normative and it is not the case 
that we ought to think logically. 
Peter Schaber is one of many philosophers who have argued for the ex-
istence of normative facts (Schaber and Nitta 2005, 107–122). The master ar-
gument presented here stands or falls with the success of his claim. If there 
are normative facts, then premise (3) is false and the argument is unsound.
Christopher J. Searle: Logic Oughtn’t be Normative DISPUTATIO PHILOSOPHICA
8
It is not the case that we ought to think logically, because the sentence 
‘we ought to think logically’ is imperative not declarative, and therefore not 
truth bearing. Thus, the extended argument does not commit the fallacy of 
petitio principii; it remains valid.
There may be axiologically normative facts but there cannot be deon-
tically normative facts as WoleĔski argues. Deontic modal verbs are only 
definable intracategorically (Searle 2019). As Frege suggested, imperatives 
have a sense but no reference (Steinberger 2017, 143–162). The deontic 
modal operators do not signify. For instance, in SDL the deontic modal OBp 
does not express a proposition, it does not quantify p; it does not assert that 
some state of affairs p pertains. OB is only definable in terms of other deon-
tic modals, such as permissibility, PE. ‘Permissible that p’ means something 
like ‘not obligatory that not p’, whereas ‘obligatory that p’ means something 
like ‘not permissible that not p’ etc. It seems like ‘ought’ means something 
like ‘obliged’, ‘obliged’ means something like ‘should’, ‘should’ means some-
thing like ‘ought’, etc. It remains entirely unclear how such imperatives, the 
definitions of which are clearly narrowly circular, can be used to construct 
deontically normative facts, where facts stand in contradistinction to theo-
ries and to values (Rundle 1993).
What counts as a normative concept is generally uncontroversial, and 
similarly uncontroversial is the division of normative concepts into those 
that are evaluative and those that are deontic (Tappolet 2014, 39–54). The 
distinction is exclusive and exhaustive. If normative concepts are not de-
ontic, then they are axiological. Therefore, if logic is normative, it is only 
axiologically so. 
By this distinction, the following claim is definable as deontically nor-
mative: ‘You ought not to believe a sentence is true when it is not.’ (Russell 
2020, 371–388) We can, of course, posit a counterfactual material condi-
tional that seems to encapsulate the same meaning but is at the same time 
free of deontic modals: ‘if you believe a sentence is true when it is not, then 
you will be in error.’ By our criterion, such a sentence can be described 
as axiologcally normative, but not as deontically normative. We can say of 
logic that it is normative in an axiological sense if we are psychologically 
disposed to value consistency.
The distinction between axiological normativity and deontic normativi-
ty, reflects the distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. 
Contrast ‘you ought to quit smoking’ with ‘if you don’t want to develop lung 
cancer, then you ought to quit smoking’. The former is a deontic sentence, a 
categorical imperative, that it not truth functional. The latter is a hypotheti-
cal imperative and can be translated salva vertiate to the contrapositive ma-
terial conditional: ‘If you quit smoking, then you won’t develop lung cancer’, 
which is non–normative. 
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In conclusion then, unless a conclusive bridge principle is forthcoming, 
it seems as if there is no escape from Hume’s guillotine, and so the master 
argument I have presented above is sound. Since deontic sentences are not 
truth bearing, it is not the case that logic is deontically normative. As Gillian 
Russell so eloquently put it: “Assuming you can’t get an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, 
it will follow that logic isn’t normative.” (Russell 2020, 371–388)
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Apstract
LOGIC OUGHTN’T BE NORMATIVE
CHRISTOPHER J. SEARLE
Presumably, the exponent of logical normativity believes it to be the case that 
rational agents ought to reason logically. If the converse holds, and the exponent 
of logical normativity believes either (a) that it is false that rational agents ought 
to reason logically or (b) that the claim that rational agents ought to reason logi-
cally is not truth–functional, then any attempt to formulate sound arguments in 
support of their position will be either question–begging or self–contradictory. 
To argue in favour of the normative status of logic involves the assumption that 
the issue is substantive. I draw a distinction between deontic and axiological 
normativity as applied to logical theory and demonstrate that because deontic 
sentences are not truth–functional, logic cannot be normative in the deontic 
sense. I conclude that the only sense in which logical theory may be thought of 
as normative is axiologically.
KEY WORDS: logic, logical normativity, normative logic, logical theory, deontology, 
axiologic
